In What Sense is Whitehead’s Speculative Philosophy a First Philosophy?

Abstract

Whitehead describes his metaphysics as speculative philosophy in order to emphasize the fact, among other reasons, that he perceives philosophy as a progressive enterprise, always approximating the ultimate truths about reality without rendering them completely apprehendable in actuality. This metaphysical humility, I argue, does not change the nature of the metaphysical enterprise in which he is engaged, namely one that endorses the logical possibility of formulating the ultimate principles that render reality intelligible. I illustrate this logical nature of Whitehead’s metaphysics by showing its similarities with, and differences from, Aristotle’s first philosophy, arguing that, in its content, Whitehead’s metaphysics is a kind of first philosophy that contains the same objectives as Aristotle’s metaphysics. Still, I show why Whitehead’s metaphysics is not an Aristotelian first philosophy but simply one species in the genus of first philosophies.